One of the most striking things about David Cameron’s emergence as Conservative leader towards the end of 2005 was his willingness to mark himself against and to openly draw parallels between himself and the then Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair. The apotheosis of this being his infamous desire to be the “heir to Blair”. Looking at Cameron’s big political gambles, the one big conclusion you draw from Cameron’s time as both Tory leader and Prime Minister is that Blair would have been far to astute to have attempted those things.
Before the
catastrophic European Referendum, there was Cameron - the first Conservative to
enter Downing Street since John Major was swept away in the early hours of May
2nd 1997. The Brown Labour government
was deeply unpopular and rocked by division.
Yet Cameron’s inability to ‘seal the deal’, lead to his Conservative
party falling 18 seats short of an overall majority. Conceivably, in the
position that Cameron was in, Blair could have reached out to the Lib Dems and
offered a coalition. Conceivably as well
though, Blair would not have given the Lib Dems as much leeway as Cameron did,
most notably with the deal over the AV referendum.
The curious thing
about Cameron’s time in Number 10 has been his relationship with his
Chancellor, an even more overrated political operator than Cameron. George Osborne’s preference for political
point scoring, not seen since the days of Gordon Brown in Number 11, has seen such great political choices as as the now notorious
“Omnishambles” budget of 2012, the voluntary ban on increasing income tax, the
notorious “Sermon on the pound”, the reckless spending of the money found last
autumn before finding that the figures were not as good as they looked and the
arrogant re-branding of the minimum wage.
It is an unwanted facial tick that sees the veneer of a smirk appear on
Osborne’s face whenever he speaks. It
makes him look smug and untrustworthy.
The big surprise is that Osborne’s status as Cameron’s own heir apparent
took so long to vaporise.
The second part
of Cameron’s premiership does contain the reckless risk taking and poor
decision making which will probably be his hallmark. Prior to the European
referendum, his biggest risk was the Scottish Independence referendum. Given that polling indicated a strong vote
for Scotland to remain within the union at the start of the campaign, the
campaign prosecuted by the Better Together campaigners contrived to concede 26%
to the pro-Independence Yes Scotland.
I’ve already touched on Osborne’s big mistake – “The Sermon on the Pound”
– however Cameron made four big strategic errors. The first error being the refusal to debate
with Alex Salmond.
The sight of the
Prime Minister refusing to debate with the leader of the Scottish National
Party did not diminish Salmond but showed Cameron up as someone who ducked and
eveaded one on one television debates.
It is noteworthy that apart from the three ‘Leaders Debates’ in 2010,
Cameron has only faced an opponent(s) in the television studios once since then
– the seven way debate last April. His
second mistake being his refusal to fully engage in that referendum
campaign. Nothing shows this more than
the week of the first poll lead for independence. Where Milliband and Clegg had campaign
engagements, Cameron made just the one speech, in an office in Edinburgh.
His third mistake
was in pressing to keep the further devolution option known as Devo-max off the
ballot paper. Substantially more powers
for Holyrood was previously the settled will of the Scottish People. Had that
being on the ballot, then it’s possible that the SNP surge… indeed the clamour
for a second Independence referendum by Independence supporters over the
weekend… would not be happening. Yes,
the pro-Unionists clung on – securing a comfortable but not completely decisive
victory – but it was closer than it needed to be. Just after 7am on the morning of the 19th
September, Cameron made his fourth tactical blunder when he made his victory
speech. The tying of further powers to
the Scottish Parliament to English Votes for English Laws may have been done to
placate his own backbenchers, but its effect was to galvanise the defeated SNP
supporters and inspire them on to… well
the bloodbath of the following May’s Westminster election for Labour. Even now 13 months down the line, this now
looks like the staring point for the complete collapse of the Labour movement
as a whole.
The mistake which
cost Cameron his job is certainly his biggest, and is the worst show of
political judgement since Blair decided to invade Iraq with the USA. When Cameron announced the vote will be in
his election manifesto for the next election, UKIP were finishing second in
by-elections and sort of pushing for victory in them. They weren’t winning these by-elections but the
media were fixated on them. Funnily
enough, Cameron’s European troubles came after the referendum was announced as
party policy – UKIP pushed the Tories into third in the European Elections of
20014 while both Mark Reckless and Douglas Carswell defected from the Tories to
become UKIP’s first MP’s. There was no
need for Cameron to pledge the referendum but as I pointed out at the time,
maybe part of Cameron’s thinking was dominated by his poor relationship with the
EU leaders at that time. Maybe as well
another calculation was that Cameron would likely fall short again in the
election, so would be able to blame the Lib Dems if they blocked the
referendum.
When Blair was
forced out nearly 10 years ago, his long time adversary Gordon Brown took over. No doubt helped by the relatively invisible public
profile of his leadership opponent - one John McDonnell. Cameron’s own version
of Brown is his old ‘friend’ from Oxford, Boris Johnson. Unlike Labour, who seem to pick leaders on a
buggins turn basis, the Tories have always snubbed the favourite. While Boris is clearly the favourite, I suspect
that there is someone else out there who can, and possibly will, stop
Boris. Who knows, maybe someone that can
somehow manage to postpone activating the key Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.